


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June 1969


ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

Office of the Director




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
*PO/RO = Production Officer/Research Officer



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


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OCI NOTICE
NO. 20-222

PERSONNEL
20 June 1969

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF ASSIGNMENTS TO KEY POSITIONS

The following assignments apply to the organization established by OCI Notice 1-25, 18 June 1969: where changes are involved, assignments will become effective during the summer change-over period.

25X1A

Office of the Director

Director of Current Intelligence
Deputy Director of Current Intelligence
Special Assistant for Management

E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr.

Production Staff

Chief, Production Staff
Deputy Chief, Production Staff
Deputy Chief, Production Staff, for CIB
Special Assistant for Publications
Indications Officer

Presentations Branch

Chief, Presentations Branch
News Analysis Officer
Foreign Liaison Control Officer
CIB Panel Secretary
Information Control Officer

Publications Support Branch

Chief, Publications Support Branch

██████████ will continue to perform his duties as Chief of the former II Staff until his retirement in 1970.

25X1A

Registry Branch 25X1A

Chief, Registry Branch

Research Staff

Chief, Research Staff
Deputy Chief, Research Staff (NIS)
Chief, History Project
NIS Officer

Special Projects Staff

Chief, Special Projects Staff
Deputy Chief, Special Projects Staff

Management Staff

Chief, Management Staff
Career Development Officer
Plans and Technology Officer
Chief, Administrative Branch

Operations Center

Chief, Operations Center
Deputy Chief, Operations Center
Night Senior Duty Officer
Night Senior Duty Officer
Night Senior Duty Officer

National Indications Center

Director 25X1A
CIA Chief

Far East Division

Chief, Far East Division
Deputy Chief, Far East Division
Senior Analyst for China
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer

Chief, Southeast Asia Branch
Deputy Chief, Southeast Asia Branch

Chief, North Asia Branch
Chief, China External Branch
Chief, China Internal Branch

Vietnam Task Force

Chief, Vietnam Task Force
Special Assistant
Special Assistant
Chief, Northern Branch
Chief, Southern Branch 25X1A

European Division

Chief, European Division
Deputy Chief, European Division
Senior Analyst for the Soviet Union
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer

Chief, Regional Branch
Chief, Northern Europe Branch 25X1A
Chief, Southern Europe [REDACTED]
Chief, Eastern Europe Branch
Deputy Chief, Eastern Europe Branch
Chief, Soviet External Branch
Chief, Soviet Internal Branch

Middle East-Africa Division

Chief, Middle East Africa Division
Deputy Chief for Middle East
Deputy Chief for Africa
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer

25X1A

Chief, Greece-Turkey-Iran Branch
Deputy Chief, Greece-Turkey-Iran Branch

25X6 Chief, Arab States- [REDACTED] Branch 25X6
Deputy Chief, Arab States- [REDACTED] Branch

Chief, South Asia Branch
Deputy Chief, South Asia Branch

Chief, North and East Africa Branch
Deputy Chief, North & East Africa Branch

Chief, West Africa Branch
Deputy Chief, West Africa Branch

Chief, Southern Africa Branch

Western Hemisphere Division

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer
Production/Research Officer

25X1A

Chief, Northern Branch
Deputy Chief, Northern Branch

Chief, Southern Branch
Deputy Chief, Southern Branch

Chief, Caribbean Branch
Deputy Chief, Caribbean Branch

25X1A

E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence

N 1-26

OCI NOTICE
NO. 1-26

ORGANIZATION
20 June 1969

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OCI RESEARCH STAFF

Ref: OCI Notice No. 1-25, 18 June 1969--Realignment
of the OCI Organizational Structure

1. The referent Notice announced the creation of an OCI Research Staff whose Chief will report directly to the D/OCI. The purpose of this Notice is to describe the functions of that Staff and to specify the duties of its personnel.

2. The Chief of Research is charged with:

- stimulating research throughout OCI
- setting up a formal research program through negotiation with the geographic Divisions
- maintaining records of research in progress and completed
- encouraging joint research projects with other DDI components
- establishing contact with other elements of the Agency and with other government departments, with academic centers, and with research institutes
- coordinating the overall research program with NIS commitments
- monitoring the progress of the OCI historical project

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification


3. The Deputy Chief of the Research Staff will have, in addition to the normal duties of a deputy, the responsibility for ensuring that the Office meets its NIS commitments. He will report directly to the D/OCI on NIS matters.

4. Responsibility for direct supervision of research in process and for substantive judgments contained in research products is vested in the geographic Division Chiefs. They will, however, exercise this supervision in consultation with the Chief of the Research Staff.

5. Research in OCI is defined as those projects requiring extensive analysis whether or not such analysis results in finished intelligence products. Much of this analysis will be ultimately committed to paper for dissemination, but in other cases it may be aimed simply at building a data base or contributing to a methodology or at exploring computer applications to intelligence problems. Although much of the research will be political in character, it need not be so exclusively. Where expertise is available and where the intelligence problem requires it, the analysis should draw on sociological, psychological, and anthropological disciplines.

6. The D/OCI or DD/OCI will determine in cases of doubt whether a study about to be undertaken falls in the purview of the Research Staff or the Production Staff.

25X1A


E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Director of Current Intelligence

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1 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT : NIS Delinquencies
FROM : E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr.

1. I have examined the delays in OCI's production of NIS sections. As expected, I found that every dereliction was in some way unique: a small misstep at the start of a lengthy process expanded itself geometrically by the finish; or, the transfer of an NIS writer to a current intelligence crisis created a gap in the momentum of producing a General Survey never made up, etc.

2. It is easy to observe that if deadlines in current production were missed to the same degree as those in the NIS program, there would be no OCI. But such an observation ignores the essential fact that writing NIS sections is not producing current intelligence and vice versa. It is in great part because the analyst feels little sense of urgency in his NIS assignment, much less of relevancy, that he is unperturbed when schedules start slipping. And, depending on how close he is to the analyst, the supervisor, who almost always is oriented to current intelligence, tends to feel pretty much the same way. Most analysts assigned NIS sections discover that their work is not research either. It is collation, cut and paste according to set outlines. Sometimes new statistics have to be hunted up, but that is work any librarian can do. The reaction of current intelligence analysts to the real nature of NIS work is in two words: not good.

3. What can management do in this situation? First, it can do the obvious: assemble the NIS apparatus-- particularly that part of it with the poorest record-- and jack it up once again in the effort to maintain schedules despite the aridness of the assignment. That will have some effect, at least for a few months. Second, management can appeal to the NIS committee for an easing of the schedule in cases of valid analytical difficulty. There seldom are such cases, however. Analytical difficulty usually translates to mean ineptitude and/or sheer boredom with the process.

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4. Assigning inept analysts to the NIS is quite clearly a failure of the supervisor, not the employee. But assigning an office newcomer to do an NIS section is something else again. The new analyst may have come aboard with a high reputation; an NIS section theoretically should constitute a good first test of this reputation. If, however, the neophyte's reputation is undeserved or misplaced, the timetable of his NIS section may be in deep trouble. By the time the supervisor satisfies himself that the analyst has had a fair chance but is not the man for the task, it is already too late. Picking up the pieces and starting over again with another writer will get the job done, but almost surely it will get done quite late. One lesson suggests itself from all this: NIS sections should not be assigned to newcomers for training purposes.

5. Overcoming boredom with and distaste for the NIS process is quite another matter. The OCI supervisor knows that it is in this area that most of the lags in the schedule set in. I am not confident that there is a solution for this problem given the process as it now exists, the outlines as they now exist, and the final product itself. To overcome the disinterest in the NIS on the part at least of the OCI producers, we may have to turn to new systems, new ways of doing things.

6. Any drastic revamping of the NIS would require the support of the Pentagon. This we are not likely to get. What we can do is radically revise OCI's approach to the job. One proposal (which would fly directly in the teeth of the previous recommendation to avoid using NIS assignments for training purposes) would be to make preparation of a General Survey the subject of an Agency internship--a six months' internship.

7. Certain safeguards would be required before such a system could come into effect. First, the participants would have to be hand-picked by OCI; on-campus recruitment of graduate students in regional studies should be instituted (much as OER had done for years). Second, the candidates would have to be paid relatively handsome stipends: \$5,000 for a six months' (or two quarters) stint?* Third, the candidates would

*In the Annex there is a rough statement of costs for OCI's participation in the NIS during the present fiscal year. These figures are by no means precise, but they give a general indication of cost using manpower on board.

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have to demonstrate in advance an ability to write cogently and to organize lengthy pieces of expository writing. Fourth, OCI would have to maintain a stable of resource people to assist these young graduate students, to monitor their progress, to edit their drafts, etc. Finally, it should be noted that some NIS obligations simply could not be done in this manner--for example, the section 57's and the General Surveys on the larger, more complex countries.

8. There are some risks in this approach, but there are also potential gains unrelated to alleviating the NIS burden. For example, one cannot be certain that every young graduate student recruited is going to cut the mustard--any more than is every new CT. What does the Agency do with the candidate who early in his six months' stint shows that he is not going to be able to finish the Survey on which he is working? I think the Directorate has to be prepared to cope. We must locate and earmark donkeywork that needs to be done until the man's six-month contract is completed. If washouts occur once in a while, some benefits can also come along. For example, brief exposure to the Agency even in such mundane work as the NIS could easily result in a number of long-term recruitments. A program of limited Agency exposure to the NIS interns might be laid on. One cautionary note: graduate students should be recruited for money. They should not be shilled into expecting great intellectual adventures. This is a job that has to be done, period.

9. Another possible solution to the NIS burden would start from an entirely different assumption about the nature of the task. The graduate-student-on-hire approach assumes that good grounding in country or regional studies would provide sufficient expertise for writing a general survey. The other tack would be the recruitment of mature editors from within the Agency for rotational stints. The assumption underlying this approach would be that preparation of the NIS demands basically some writing skill and the capacity to organize materials. Doing the General Survey in this fashion, however, would mean that, since editors without country expertise would be involved, the writers would have to work closely with their counterpart OCI desk officers. This approach has another advantage. It would make it possible for such a person to change his job style for the six months necessary to tackle a General Survey. There are scores, possibly hundreds, of editors tucked away in various parts of the Agency,

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masquerading under various job descriptions. Many of them are reported to be bored stiff. But even if they are only slightly restless, why not go for some flexibility of experience?

10. At this stage I would think it would be wise to try a couple of test programs before becoming deeply involved in either the external recruitment approach or the internal rotation approach. Perhaps both systems could be tried at the same time for comparative purposes. Any such test or tests would naturally require the indulgence of OBGI. In other words, OBGI would have to declare itself willing to risk missed timetables for the sake of the experiment--or, in the extraordinary circumstance of a success, OBGI would have to be willing to accept a manuscript ahead of schedule.

11. More radical changes in the NIS structure and process may be necessary in the long run. Changes of this nature would naturally go beyond OCI's jurisdiction; they are included here only as provocative suggestions. Herewith some notions:

a. Secure an outside consulting firm to examine the NIS with a view to determining two things: (1) What elements do its consumers regard as so essential that they must be retained; and (2) How and at what cost can the essential elements be recorded and maintained for Community use by ADP techniques. I suggest the outside consulting firm because I don't feel anyone within the Community can be expected to be objective about the NIS.

b. Reduce the overall NIS burden by eliminating coverage of the major countries on which good, open material is readily available. This would mean, in turn, the conversion of the NIS committee from its present role as scheduling agent into a more substantive body. The committee's work could be expanded into a variety of innovative fields by the use of subcommittees and task forces. It might, for example, meet to make determinations about the countries to be dropped. Demanding even more skill would be the designation of openly available volumes to be included on an acceptable literature list.

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12. Almost all the changes discussed above would result in some loss of function for OCI. Some part of the responsibility for NIS production would remain under any new formula, but in all cases the impact on OCI manpower would be less. I anticipate this would result in pressure for the contraction of OCI's personnel strength. Frankly I see no problem with this. There are a number of officers who should be urged to move on. Reduction in function would provide management with additional persuasive leverage. Such leverage should only be used with lengthy advanced notice and assistance in planning departures.

E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.

Attachment: Annex

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ANNEX

I. Divisional Totals



25X1A

A. European		10,400 man hours
B. Far East		10,535
C. Western Hemisphere		11,874
D. MEA (3 Africa branches only)		22,800
E. NIS Staff		8,320

II. Individual Divisions

A. European - 7 General Surveys; no Section 57's
in past 12 months



25X1A

Full-time personnel	:	
Total full-time salaries:	:	
Estimated man hours	:	8,320
Part-time personnel	:	
Part-time salary	:	
Man hours	:	2,080

25X1A

B. Far East - 6 General Surveys; 2 Section 57's

25X1A

Full-time personnel	:	
Total full-time salaries:	:	
Estimated man hours	:	9,575
Part-time personnel	:	
Part-time salaries	:	
Part-time hours	:	960

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ANNEX (cont'd)

25X1A

C. Western Hemisphere - 11 General Surveys;
3 Section 57's

Full-time personnel :

Total full-time salaries:

Estimated man hours : 9,760

Part-time personnel :

25X1A

Part-time salaries :

Part-time man hours : 2,114

D. Middle East-Africa - 7 General Surveys;
4 Section 57's

25X1A

Full-time personnel :

Full-time salaries :

Full-time hours : 20,800

Part-time personnel : 3 GS-14's

Part-time salaries :

Part-time hours : 2,000

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(These figures do not include Middle East and
South Asia NIS work.)

25X1A

E. NIS Staff

Full-time personnel :

Full-time salaries :

Full-time hours : 8,320

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23 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : OCI's Contribution to the NIS Program

1. A statistical summary of OCI's deliveries of NIS sections during FY 70 is presented in Annex A, stated in terms which permit direct comparisons with our performance in previous years. A strong finish enabled us to end the year with 99% of the scheduled sections delivered by its close--a better record in this regard than in any previous year except FY 68. But in the more significant indices noted in Annex A the year compared poorly with FY 69, which had been generally on a par with FY 68. In FY 69, for example, nearly two-thirds of the NIS sections met their OBGI deadline while in FY 70 only a little more than a third did so. Furthermore, the late sections of FY 70 were, on the average, late by over twice as many working days as the late sections of FY 69.

2. As among the presumptive reasons for this marked sag, I would cite three general factors which were present in FY 70 but not in FY 69. One was the inauguration in November 1969 of the new series of Country Handbooks, some 25 of which had been published by early July 1969. Skillful scheduling of these "command performance" items, so as to take advantage wherever possible of recently performed NIS research, minimized direct competition with NIS production (i.e., on the same country), but indirect competition for manpower was unavoidable, showing up particularly in demands on typing services and on the time Division Research Officers had available for the NIS. A second factor was a number of personnel shifts (two among the Division R. O. s, two in this unit) occurring early in FY 70. A third was the discontinuance at the beginning of FY 70 of a special reporting system which had been instituted well back in FY 68, at the time of an OBGI complaint on NIS delinquencies, in an effort to keep the OCI front office aware of upcoming trouble spots in the elaborately phased process of NIS production. It was discontinued because its preparation was rather time-consuming, the front office no longer seemed to be making much use of it, and the regional divisions seemed to have largely conquered their original tendency to assume that deadlines months distant would never actually arrive.

3. The above are general considerations to which I make no attempt to assign relative weights. In Annex B, however, an attempt is made to provide specific explanations for the individual delinquent sections, in line with your request for

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this information. I have used a modified form of OBGI's table of 29 April 1970 for this purpose, extending it to the end of the fiscal year, including the name of the analyst and the branch chief concerned, and giving my best judgment as to the main reasons for the delay of that section. (As in OBGI's list, the small section 1s have been omitted from this tabulation as involving no significant amount of research and the now-discontinued Section 57s have also been omitted.) These judgments are based on a transcript (running to some six single-spaced pages in all) made from this unit's daily log book of NIS transactions, plus the Divisional R. O.s' monthly progress reports and such other sources as are available to us, but I would not expect everyone to agree with my final evaluation, since in nearly every instance a number of different causes were involved.

4. The producer of the NIS draft can usually point to some event occurring in the country at the time which made the writing more difficult than if the event had not occurred. Of the countries on the present delinquency list, however, I would myself consider that this substantive explanation was a significant and justifiable cause of delay only in the cases of Laos (in which case the delay was relatively minor), of Ceylon (where a major electoral upset after completion of the Section 5 occasioned extensive re-writing) and of Brazil (where the President's heart attack and the kidnapping of the US Ambassador in early September caused serious political uncertainty at a time when an already late Section 5 was in this office for review). Of all the countries on the FY 70 list, Libya probably suffered the greatest political upset, yet its General Survey made the December deadline to OBGI despite the September coup. A less glamorous source of lateness is the draft's not having been started in time, but it is of course hard for someone outside the Division concerned to determine exactly why the analyst was not available to start work at the recommended time; if he is still involved in a previous NIS assignment which is far behind schedule, we will know it, but if other assignments interfere, we may not. Similarly, with lateness caused by delays in typing or in making revisions arising out of this unit's review of the draft: we can note that the delay was caused by other tasks in the Division, but we cannot determine the importance of these other tasks relative to OCI's external commitment for delivery of the NIS section. (Two of the division chiefs, I understand originally volunteered to produce Country Handbooks beyond their commitments for the year, though this would meet no clear need and would certainly aggravate the updating problem.) Still another significant cause of delay is unacceptable weakness in the original analyst's NIS draft--frequently because the task was

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beyond the powers of the analyst assigned to it. A draft starting this way will probably miss its target date to Res/NIS if the Division R. O. is conscientious and not exceptionally well supplied with spare time; if the R.O. decides that meeting the Res/NIS target date overrides all other considerations, the draft may then encounter a period of excessive delay in Res/NIS (and perhaps cause undue delays to other NIS drafts due to review there), since some standards must be maintained on papers sent out for extra-Agency review as OCI products.

5. The above considerations suggest that the large underlying factor in most of the delays is really the basic attitude of the producing component towards the NIS--not, strictly speaking, toward the NIS program as such but toward OCI's role in the program. Since the belief has been held by various members of the Office with varying degrees of emotional intensity that it is inappropriate for OCI to be an NIS contributor at all, it may be helpful to examine the "pros" and "cons" of the present association in the perspective presumably gained from the experience of the past half-dozen years and in the light of some of the larger intelligence considerations involved. This examination, as set forth in Annex C, is aimed at uncovering some of the roots of OCI attitudes regarding the NIS, and seeing if any of them appear relevant to the problem of improving OCI performance on NIS deliveries. Assuming the approximate accuracy of the statement made in both "pro" and "con" lists, I would suggest two conclusions that OCI supervisors might profitably draw from these statements. One is that producing NIS contributions is not quite the irrelevant and profitless proposition for OCI which they have sometimes assumed--and deserves commensurate respect. The other is that NIS production in OCI labors under inherent handicaps--especially that (noted in C-4-a-(3)) of its end-product's passing out of the office laterally and not up the chain of command where promotions and other benefits are normally bestowed--and that these handicaps cannot be removed merely by official pronouncements but need to be attacked by positive administrative action.

6. Improving administrative action, in my opinion, should be taken mainly in the general frame of reference suggested by the foregoing analysis and on the assumption that so large, detailed and cumbersome a program as the NIS is not very susceptible to instant and isolated intuitions. Since I see the basic problem as one of OCI attitudes toward the NIS, I consider that front office administrative action is almost as important for its secondary psychological consequences as for its direct effects. The recent authorization to Res/NIS to commission typing overtime between 15 June and 15 July was helpful not only in meeting end-of-the-year deadlines for delayed NIS sections but also in implying that the program

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was regarded as of some importance by the front office. Similarly useful would be an occasional pointed reminder to OCI division chiefs that the NIS, as an external commitment for which the office gets explicit budgetary support, must often take priority over projects which they may personally regard as more interesting. Such front office actions of course need to come in appropriate context and are likely to lose their effect if repeated too often.

7. Along the same line, the regional supervisors might be specifically reminded that the NIS is a demanding task and that some indication of ability to cope with it effectively should be a prerequisite for being assigned an NIS section to write. (A cautionary example of the opposite procedure is provided by the FY 70 experience on Peru, where an analyst who had proved rather weak on NIS work in an area he knew was assigned two General Survey sections in an area where he was a comparative neophyte and on a country which was in process of considerable political and social change.) Analysts who show signs of having gone stale on the NIS (e.g., by flatness and inflexibility in responding to changing NIS requirements) might well be assigned to a tour of duty on daily items.

8. Also by way of guarding against staleness, a look by an entirely fresh eye at OCI's NIS production procedures would be very much in order. It might prove possible, for example, to find some means by which an originally strong NIS draft, like the last General Survey on India, could shortcut some of the procedures needed for a weak one. Another possibility might be the shortening of the overall NIS processing time by postponing the incorporation of embassy comments into the draft until the stage of NIS Committee review. (This change would have to be accomplished largely by negotiation with OBG and the other NIS contributors and there are aspects of such a plan which would be unwelcome to many OCI analysts.)

9. I also have one formal change to suggest in OCI's personnel procedures as a means of putting performance on the NIS more on a par with that in other aspects of the Office's substantive work. OCI intelligence officers have in various instances been promoted on the ground that they have performed well on the NIS, but I would question whether they are really rated on the same competitive basis as those concerned mainly with current intelligence. For the reasons indicated in Para # 5 above and in Annex C, even their own division chief is unlikely to have any first-hand acquaintance with their NIS work and the other members of the Career Service Board will have had even less. Reliance may be placed on complimentary remarks made by State Department or Embassy reviewers concerning their NIS drafts, but such laudatory quotations are not always to be

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25X1A taken at face value. Sometimes they are only a polite preface to sharp criticism later; seldom are they based on a familiarity with many NIS documents (the reviewer himself being usually a specialist on a narrow area); and in any case the external reviewer is in no position to know how much of the work is the reputed author's and how much the supervisor's and reviewers'. (A recent case in point is the comment on Zambia Sec 5 made by the US Ambassador in Lusaka A-165 of 25 June, that "the analyst is to be congratulated on the lucidity and accuracy of his draft." The original draft of this section was the work of [REDACTED] but was considered by everyone else concerned with it to be an unusually weak effort, and by the time the section reached the Ambassador, [REDACTED] had become a very minor stockholder.) Various reviewers in OBGi and in Res/NIS, of course, have a much broader basis for evaluating performance on the NIS, yet I can recall only two or three occasions (all from the same division) when my professional opinion was solicited about an NIS-producer at Fitness Report time. I would be very chary of having my opinion about one regional division's NIS performance cited to its fellow divisions, but I would consider it appropriate for the front office reviewing officer of the Fitness Reports on Branch Chiefs and R. O.s to have Res/NIS views on these officers' NIS production to use as he thought suitable in reviewing the ratings given them. (OBGi reviewers might also be discreetly queried.) And, if such a procedure were to be instituted, I would think it psychologically useful for public announcement of the fact to be made. 25X1A

25X1A 9. Looking somewhat further ahead, I believe there are probably various changes possible in the General Survey (both in basic concepts and in production techniques) which would mean ultimate manpower savings for OCI, but these would be mainly matters to explore in cooperation with OBGi and in some cases would require considerable experimentation. One experiment, designed to see to what extent the ADP-recorded version of the CIWR might aid in the updating of the France General Survey next spring, has already been discussed tentatively with [REDACTED] who stands ready to conduct this experiment in such time as his work for Proctor on the Bayes Theorem permits. Earlier accounts from CRS have proved exaggerated as to what is now available on tapes, but we still count on pushing ahead, though perhaps at a somewhat slower pace.

10. On one mechanical problem that has long plagued NIS producers--i.e., the typing load--a detailed study has already

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been made--also [REDACTED] after my informally discussing the project with [REDACTED]. This study related only to the preparation of NIS drafts on MTST machines for review by this office and later by the external reviewers; it did not concern itself with the preparation of analysts' original drafts for their regional division supervisors. It was based on an actual page-count of standard NIS text material for each section produced by OCI in FY 67, FY 68, FY 69 and FY 70 (the average total for these four years turned out to be 8221 pages) and on a conservative calculation of the machine and typist facilities available (authorized strength during FY 70), assuming that the typist worked steadily at the NIS task for a total of only five hours a day with normal leave and holiday allowances. The conclusions of this study (whose detailed findings probably have relevance for more than their NIS implications) indicate that the typing log-jams which have frequently caused late delivery of NIS sections are more a matter of managing resources efficiently than of an absolute shortage of either typists or MTST machines. The total NIS demand on tape-typing, by this calculation, comes to less than three typist man-years for all of OCI; in none of the four regional divisions during FY 70 did this load exceed 36.5% of machine capacity or 15.0% of typist capacity; and projections for the FY 71 NIS load indicate about a 10% decline in this NIS load (owing mainly to the incorporation of the old Section 57 into the General Survey). The original typing part of the NIS load (for which an MTST-2 is adequate) is about double the "transfer" part of the load (for which an MTST-4 is required). Though there is evidence in the record that none of the four divisions has been allowing quite enough time for typing in their internal scheduling of a given section, the most striking thing emerging from the study is perhaps the fact that the division with the largest NIS typing load has been handling this load itself, while each of the other three has depended in varying degrees on external help. This division is D/ME-A, which had a total of 3768 NIS pages to type in FY 70 and whose NIS load was mentioned above as demanding 36.5% of its MTST and 15.0 of its typist capacity.

11. In my opinion at least, one important constituent in the Middle East-Africa Division's superior record on typing is a change in its general attitude toward the NIS which has been discernible over the past year or so. I do not mean that the NIS has become a favorite occupation there, but simply that it now seems to be regarded primarily as a commitment to be fulfilled effectively rather than as a headache to be ignored or a grievance to be denounced. The change, which has been specially notable on Africa, seems to me the result of no single

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force: administrative toughness has played an important part but so, I think, have a number of very indirect influences, including long continued OCI pressure on ORGI to be more realistic in its scheduling of African General Surveys. The change is of course not total, and may not be fully reflected yet in the delivery record of NIS sections to ORGI, but it is evident to the reviewers in this unit, and to me is one of the more encouraging developments in OCI's NIS record over the past year.

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Deputy for NIS, Research Staff, OCI

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - D/OCI file
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ANNEX C: Some "Pros" and "Cons" to OCI's Present Role in the NIS Program

1. There is, of course, nothing inevitable about having the political and sociological sections of the NIS produced by OCI. For a number of years these were produced along with other material by what is now INR in the Department of State, and for about a year by an NIS-only shop (the Research Division) in what is now OBGI--with, I believe, results which were at least no better than OCI's so far as meeting deadlines were concerned. A great many considerations, differently evaluated from different points of view, enter into such decisions on the organization of intelligence production. The following attempt to set down what seem to me significant "pros" and "cons" of the present basic system (not necessarily including all present implementing arrangements) is written largely, but not entirely, from an OCI point of view.
2. One statement that I do not think it necessary to include in either the "pro" or "con" column is the proposition that NIS production takes a lot of OCI manpower--one estimate puts it as high as 50 man years annually. But I exclude figures here because most of them have been more hasty guesses than serious calculations, and I know of none which closely approaches the manpower increment OCI originally received from the former Research Division or even the smaller total annually budgeted on NIS account.
3. The "pro" factors might be summarized under the following categories:
 - (a) Saving in overhead costs through reduction of overlap. This in turn divides into two sub-categories:
 - (1) Avoidance of duplication in administrative machinery and in arrangements for the physical handling of information.
 - (2) Minimization of duplication in the more costly matter of the analytical assessment and digesting of information. With some conspicuous (and often cited) exceptions such as health and sanitation data or manpower statistics, much of the material used by OCI in its political and sociological contributions to the NIS, is also relevant for many of its traditional "current intelligence" publications; in fact, in various CIWR special articles or background memos for the visit of a foreign chief of state, it would be very difficult to draw any sharp line between what is "current"

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and what is "basic" intelligence. The critical difference between NIS contributions and much other OCI production lies not in the substance itself but in how it is organized and written up, and on what production schedule.

- (b) Simplification of the problem of substantive coordination. Having the regionally responsible OCI branch chief review an NIS draft before it goes out for review by State and DIA deals immediately with a problem which can become much more difficult when substantive coordination must be obtained from an independent office. Such questions of political judgment arise more frequently than one might expect in the political (# 5) section of the NIS and even in parts of the sociological (# 4), and--unlike, say, assessing the accuracy of a photograph or a statement made about an individual personality--these may be overall assessments depending to a considerable extent on knowledge of the whole situation of a country.
- (c) Reference material such as the NIS is likely to be more relevant in its tone and general orientation when produced in an organization oriented toward current intelligence problems that when produced in one further removed from the policy-maker's day-to-day concerns.
- (d) An organized and trained intelligence reserve is at hand for major emergencies--of, say, the scope of the Cuban missile crisis. In practice, OCI has in the past profited very considerably from the existence of this intelligence reserve--sometimes using it improperly (in my view) in emergencies which were far smaller in scope, sometimes using it, without prejudice to NIS commitments, on Intelligence Studies or other long range papers. Access to this additional manpower has been possible because the substantial manhour profit indicated under (a) above has in practice been allowed to accrue mainly to OCI itself.

4. The "con" factors might be listed under three main headings:

- (a) The different producing tempos and consumer targets of the NIS and daily intelligence, respectively, make heavy demands on the flexibility of the producing organization, despite the common nature of the information being processed.

- (1) As regards producing tempo, the writer of daily intelligence, though under great pressure while writing, is usually quite free of that item by the

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next day, whereas the writer of an NIS section must live with his item through successive reviews and revisions for months. (This NIS situation is not so unusual in general human experience but in an OCI context it has in fact aroused considerable indignation.)

- (2) As regards the consumer target, the writer of daily intelligence can envisage his item being read in essentially the same frame of reference as he writes it--and by a VIP--whereas the writer of an NIS section, knowing far less about the circumstances in which his item may be read, must watch his tenses carefully and aim for a durability of several years.
 - (3) As a practical fact of bureaucracy, the writer of daily intelligence knows that his item, if its subject matter is important enough--will go right up the chain of command and may conceivably bring him favorably to the attention of officials well beyond his immediate superiors. (Even the most resented "command performance" item bears this potential sweetener attached.) The NIS-writer, in the other hand, knows that his product normally goes no further up his direct chain of command than his branch chief--and indeed cannot realistically do so because of its length--and then passes out of OCI laterally to a non-prestigious destination.
 - (b) NIS production gets held up by current intelligence emergencies. This frequently recurring complaint of the NIS program management focuses not on what happens in emergencies of Cuban-missile-crisis size but in situations where the urgency is not too apparent to those outside OCI.
 - (c) As a fact of history, NIS production has been associated with second-class citizenship in widespread OCI opinion, despite general pronouncements to the contrary by OCI management. Beside the continuing considerations indicated in (a) above, daily intelligence has the Plymouth Rock stereotype and the NIS the Ellis Island stereotype in OCI history; personality clashes--in some instances involving people who left the NIS scene years ago--have also played a part.
5. Attempting any kind of deciding vote between the above contrasting lists is not pertinent here, but it might be appropriate to observe that it is not within OCI's power to do much unilaterally about the "pro" factors, whereas some of the "con" factors might be to some degree modified by OCI administrative action.